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Mary Kaczorekt
Introduction
On June 4, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in AARP v. EEOC (AARP III)1 ruled that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") can implement
an exemption to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA")2 allowing employers to alter, decrease, or drop health
benefits for retirees who reach the age of Medicare eligibility.3
The EEOC proposed this exemption after many employers began
dropping retiree health benefits in order to avoid liability for age
discrimination under a previous construction of the ADEA.4
Although employers are not required to provide retiree health
benefits, many older people5 rely on this coverage to meet their
health care needs.6
By allowing the EEOC to effectively repeal a portion of the
ADEA, the court undermined legislation that protects against age
discrimination. The United States is truly becoming "no country
for old men"7  and women by failing to provide adequate
protections to ensure sufficient health insurance coverage
t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2006, College
of St. Benedict. The author would like to thank Professors Stephen F. Befort, A.
Kimberley Dayton, and Kristin E. Hickman for their time and advice regarding this
article. Special thanks also to the editors and staff members of Law and
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their hard work and
encouragement, as well as my friends and family for their support.
1. 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000). All references in this Article to sections of the
ADEA refer to the relevant portions of the Act as they appear in Pub. L. No. 90-
202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
3. Id. at 565-67.
4. See infra Part II.A-B.
5. For the purpose of this Article, "older people" refers to those over sixty-five.
6. See infra Part I.
7. No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN (Paramount Pictures 2007). The phrase "no
country for old men," as used in this Article, accurately summarizes the state of
retiree health benefits in the United States, and it does not refer to the substance
of the motion picture.
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throughout retirement. Part I of this Article outlines the history
and status of health care, Medicare, and retiree health benefits in
the United States to contextualize this decision and its
consequences. Part II highlights relevant statutes and cases
leading up to AARP III. Part III discusses the court's reasoning
and analysis in AARP III. This Article concludes: the EEOC's
exemption goes beyond its limited authority in section 9 of the
ADEA; the court should not have so readily rejected the "equal
benefit/equal cost standard"' or a variation thereof; the court erred
in its application of the Chevron doctrine,9 failing to recognize the
overall congressional intent behind the ADEA; AARP's" additional
arguments under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
should not have been so easily dismissed; and better alternatives
exist for solving this problem without effectively repealing anti-
discrimination legislation.
I. Health Care, Medicare, and Retiree Health Benefits in
the United States
The United States employs a hybrid system of health
insurance, relying on both private programs and public funding."
Medicare is the most expansive public health insurance program,"
insuring about ninety-seven percent of Americans over sixty-five
years old." Yet, most of this population also rely on supplemental
insurance to meet their health care needs, often in the form of
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. AARP was formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons.
The organization shortened its name to simply "AARP" in 1999. See
http://www.aarp.orglabout-aarp/aarp-overview/a2003-01-13-aarphistory.html
(noting that the word "Retired" in its former name was inaccurate, as "44 percent of
AARP members work part time or full time").
11. See THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUBL'N NO. 654, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE:
WHY SO COSTLY? 4 (2003), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.orgt
usr doc/davis senatecommitteetestimony-654.pdf?section=4039 (describing the
United States' heath care system as a "part-public, part-private system of
insurance, managed care, and market competition").
12. See SUE A. BLEVINS, MEDICARE'S MIDLIFE CRISIS 3 (2001) ("Medicare is the
largest single payer for health care in the United States, representing 12 percent of
federal spending."). See generally BD. OF TRS., FED. HosP. INS. & FED.
SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY
MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS (2007) [hereinafter TRs.' ANNUAL REPORT]
(providing detailed current and projected spending on Medicare).
13. Marilyn Moon, Meeting Health and Long-Term Care Needs in Retirement, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 336, 339 (Gordon
L. Clark et al. eds., 2006).
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employer-backed retiree health benefits. 4
A. The Rising Cost of Health Care in the United States
Health care costs are unusually high in the United States as
compared to the rest of the world, ' and Americans are paying
more for their health care each year. 6 This problem is especially
salient with the older population, which generally has greater
needs and increased costs associated with health care. 7 As the
"baby boomer" generation ages, this problem will become a
national crisis. 8
Americans pay more for health care than other industrialized
nations, averaging 134% higher health care costs per capita. 9 As
a result, many cannot afford the health insurance they need.2"
Forty-seven million people, over fifteen percent of all Americans,
were uninsured in the United States in 2006.21 A study completed
14. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT, RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS EXAMINED: FINDINGS FROM THE KAISER/HEWITT 2006 SURVEY ON
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 1 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicare/upload/7587.pdf [hereinafter KAISER REPORT] ("Employer plans . . .
provide highly-valued supplemental benefits to more than 12 million retirees now
on Medicare.").
15. See generally THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 11, at 13-16
(summarizing health care spending and coverage disparities between the United
States and other industrialized nations).
16. See generally THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUBL'N NO. 7692,
TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND SPENDING 1 (2007), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692.pdf (compiling and summarizing data on
the annual increased costs of health care in the United States and noting "[h]ealth
care spending has risen about 2.4 percentage points faster than GDP since 1970").
17. See generally CHRISTINE K. CASSEL, MEDICARE MATTERS: WHAT GERIATRIC
MEDICINE CAN TEACH AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 25-41 (2005) (listing common
health problems for aging people); NANCY R. HoOYMAN & H. ASUMAN KIYAK,
SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 101-45 (6th ed. 2002)
(providing a background of health issues related to aging and the higher use of
health care services by elders).
18. See generally ALLIANCE FOR AGING RESEARCH, AGEISM: How HEALTH CARE
FAILS THE ELDERLY 3-4 (2003), available at http://www.agingresearch.org/content/
article/detail/694 (discussing how the projected total "sixty-five and older"
population in 2030 will be more than 20% of the population and how physicians
may stop providing services to older people if Medicare reimbursements continue to
decrease); WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE, PUBL'N No. P23-209, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 1 (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf (detailing how the
aging of the baby boomers will change the population in the United States).
19. SUSAN STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA:
LIFE AND DEATH IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 195 (2005).
20. In 2002, medical debt caused between one-third and one-half of all personal
bankruptcies, and in 2003, 46% of uninsured Americans owed money to a medical
provider. Id. at 13.
21. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBL'N NO. P60-
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by The Commonwealth Fund attributes this rising cost to a
number of factors, including "insurance underwriting cycles, the
price of services, use of services, new technologies, [and] the
administrative costs of a fragmented system." The
administrative costs of the health care system are particularly
burdensome, accounting for nearly one-third of all health care
spending2 and growing at a rapid rate. 4
Health care costs are especially high for older people, who
have increased health care issues and needs. 5 First, a significant
portion of the older population requires long-term care, such as a
nursing-home care or home health care.26 There are now about 1.5
million older people living in institutions; this number is expected
to rise to 5 million by 2040.7 Second, as people age, they take
longer to recover from illnesses and surgeries, requiring more
transitional and rehabilitative services."8 Third, older people need
more preventative health care for acute conditions (i.e., the
common cold or influenza) because the consequences of contracting
an acute condition are more severe for an older person. 9 Last, and
most significantly, many older people depend on prescription
drugs to treat chronic conditions." This dependence creates a
serious problem for older people, as prescription drugs cost two or
three times more in the United States than in other industrialized
233, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2006, at 18 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p6O-233.pdf.
22. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 11, at 5.
23. See SERED & FERNANDOPULLE, supra note 19, at 196.
24. "Administrative expenses are increasing 11.2 percent a year. Currently at
$111 billion, they are projected to rise to $223 billion in 2012." THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 11, at 2.
25. See ALLIANCE FORAGING RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 4-11.
26. See BLEVINS, supra note 12, at 72-75 (stating that in 1999, about 134
billion was spent on long-term care and in 1997, over 4% of the sixty-five and older
population lived in nursing homes).
27. Id. at 74.
28. See HOOYMAN & KIYAK, supra note 17, at 108 (describing the decline in
immunity associated with aging); Neil J. Nusbaum, Issues in Home Rehabilitative
Care, 8 ANNALS LONG-TERM CARE 11, 43-48 (2000), available at
http://www.annalsoflongtermcare.com/article/870 (describing community and home
health rehabilitative care for the elderly).
29. Eighty-nine percent of deaths due to pneumonia and influenza occur in
people aged over sixty-five, yet less than 30% of this population receive a
pneumococcal vaccination and less than 50% receive yearly influenza vaccinations.
HOOYMAN & KIYAK, supra note 17, at 105.
30. More than 80% of people aged seventy or older suffer from at least one
chronic condition, which often causes distress, pain, and daily health monitoring.
Id. at 105. Of people aged sixty-five or older, about 25% take three or more
prescription medications daily, sometimes up to fifteen different prescriptions every
day. Id. at 130.
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countries. 31
With the first baby boomers turning sixty-five in 2010, the
high cost of health care for the older population will become a
national crisis.32 The population of citizens aged sixty-five and
older is projected to double from 2003 to 2030, growing from 36
million to 72 million.33 The "oldest old" population, aged eighty-
five and older, is projected to double from 2003 to 2030 and double
again by 2050, growing from 4.7 million, to 9.6 million, to 20.9
million.34 In a country that pays more for health care per capita
than anywhere else in the world,35 the costs associated with
providing health care for this population surge will be
astronomical.8
B. The History and Coverage of Medicare
Medicare provides baseline health coverage to Americans
over age sixty-five, but this coverage is not comprehensive because
it does not fully meet the health care needs of this population.
7
Medicare has incited controversy throughout its existence, 8 and it
has been reformed several times.39 Currently, Medicare consists of
Parts A through D, which provide only baseline coverage for
beneficiaries. 4' Nearly all Medicare beneficiaries augment this
31. CASSEL, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that the powerful lobbying of the
pharmaceutical industry has blocked government negotiations of drug costs in the
United States, even though other nations bargain with the same companies to
lower costs for their citizens).
32. See cases cited supra note 18.
33. HE ET AL., supra note 18, at 6.
34. Id.
35. See supra text accompanying note 19.
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE
PROJECTIONS 2006-2016: FORECAST SUMMARY tbl.2, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2006.pdf
(projecting the cost of nursing home care to double between 2001 to 2016, growing
from 101.5 billion to 210.9 billion dollars per year).
37. See generally Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg (2000)
(encompassing all of the Medicare legislation). In 1972, Medicare was expanded to
cover people with disabilities and those suffering from end-stage renal disease.
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 2991, 1600-16, 86 Stat.
1329, 1363-64, 1465-75.
38. Compare DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006)
(satirizing the expansiveness and inefficiency of Medicare and arguing it
undermines the American values of thrift and truthfulness), with JOHN GEYMAN,
SHREDDING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE PRIVATIZATION OF MEDICARE (2006)
(challenging attempts to "privatize" Medicare).
39. See GEYMAN, supra note 38, at 32-38, for a concise history of Medicare's
issues, challenges, and changes throughout the twentieth century.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg; see Moon, supra note 13, at 336-37. See
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minimal coverage with supplemental insurance through Medicaid,
Medigap policies, or employer-backed retiree health benefits.4'
Medicare was passed in 1965 after efforts to create a national
health care system failed throughout the first half of the twentieth
century.42  The initial Medicare legislation included Part A,
hospital insurance, and Part B, supplementary medical
insurance.' Part A now covers inpatient hospital services, up to
100 days of outpatient care after a related hospital stay of over
three days, limited home health care, hospice care, and blood
received during a covered stay."4 Part B now covers "medically
necessary" services and supplies and Medicare-covered preventive
services, including: non-routine doctor services, outpatient
services and supplies, diagnostic tests, ambulance costs, medical
equipment, additional non-emergency surgeries, therapy (mental,
physical, and speech), clinical laboratory services, limited home
health care, outpatient hospital services, and blood received as an
outpatient or during a period covered under Part B.
In 1988, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act' expanded
hospital and nursing benefits, added mammography and
outpatient prescription drug coverage, and placed a cap on patient
liability. 4' The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 further increased
beneficiary protections and preventative health coverage and gave
beneficiaries the option to coordinate private insurance plans with
generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., PUBL'N NO. CMS-10050-10, MEDICARE & YOU (2007) [hereinafter
MEDICARE & YOU] (providing a straightforward, detailed description of Medicare
Parts A through D in plain language to be used by Medicare beneficiaries).
41. See Moon, supra note 13, at 336-42 (describing Medicare as a "minimal
benefit package" that is usually "supplemented by private sources" or Medicaid);
see also JILL QUADAGNO, ONE NATION UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 9 (2005) (stating that Medicare initially served to
inflate health care costs: in 1965, daily hospital charges rose almost 17%, general
practitioners' fees rose 25%, and internists' fees rose 40%).
42. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286; see
also BLEVINS, supra note 12, at 39.
43. Id. §§ 1811-17, 1831-44, 79 Stat. at 291-313; see also BLEVINS, supra note
12, at 44-46.
44. See MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 40, at 9; see also Moon, supra note 13, at
339.
45. See MEDICARE & YOU, supra note 40, at 13-19; see also Moon, supra note
13, at 339.
46. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat.
683.
47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
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their Medicare benefits. 8 In 2003, the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act created new
prescription drug benefits.49
Although Medicare provides baseline coverage, it does not
meet the health care needs of many older people. 0  Many
necessary services, such as hearing aids, dental services, eye
exams, and rehabilitation after a hospital stay of less than three
days, are not covered by Medicare."1  Medicare co-pays and
deductibles can also be unmanageable; a hospital stay between one
and sixty days, for example, has a high deductible at $992 and co-
pays can range up to $496 per day based on the length of stay. 2
Due to both inadequate coverage and enormous costs, Medicare
alone does not provide sufficient health insurance.53
Indeed, at least ninety-three percent of elderly Medicare
beneficiaries use supplemental insurance to meet their health care
needs.' About nine percent of elderly Medicare beneficiaries rely
on Medicaid, an insurance program for low-income individuals, for
this additional coverage." Another fifty percent of elderly
Medicare beneficiaries use managed care, private Medigap
policies, or other sources for their supplemental insurance. 6 The
remaining thirty-four percent of elderly beneficiaries have
employer-backed retiree health benefits to augment their
Medicare coverage.57  With the exception of employer-backed
48. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4001-06, 111 Stat. 251,
276-334; see also CMS MILESTONES, supra note 47.
49. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066; see also CMS MILESTONES, supra note 47.
50. See Moon, supra note 13, at 337 (contending Medicare is "usually
supplemented by private sources"). Medicare itself is also in a financial crisis: a
"Medicare Funding Warning" has been issued, and the Part A hospital insurance
("HI") trust fund is projected to be exhausted by 2019. TRS.' ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 12, at 13-14, 37.
51. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI, THE BASICS OF
MEDICARE: UPDATED WITH THE 2007 BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT 4-5 (2007),
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0507fact-medicare.pdf
[hereinafter EBRI FACTS] (summarizing recent Medicare costs to the beneficiary
and coverage).
52. Id. at 3.
53. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE
SPENDING AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 62 (2007), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07DataBookEntire-report.pdf [hereinafter
MEDPAC DATA] (listing different sources of supplemental insurance for Medicare
beneficiaries); see also Moon, supra note 13, at 352.
54. See MEDPAC DATA, supra note 53, at 62.
55. See Moon, supra note 13, at 343 (noting that low-income Medicare





retiree health benefits, this supplemental insurance is often
expensive and inadequate for many older people.'
As the cost of health care continues to rise and the older
population continues to grow in the United States,"5 it is
increasingly important that older people have sufficient health
insurance. Under the United States' current hybrid system,
adequate and affordable supplemental insurance is integral to the
health care of older Americans.' For many, employer-backed
retiree benefits provide the solution to inadequate health
insurance.
C. Retiree Health Benefits in the United States
Employers are not required by law to provide retiree health
benefits, but many choose to do so.62 The number of employers
choosing to provide retiree health benefits, however, is declining.'
Often this is due to the cost of domestic health care and
competition with foreign firms in a global market.' As long as the
United States relies on a hybrid system of Medicare and
supplemental insurance for older people, the future of retiree
health benefits will determine the extent of health care coverage
available to many older Americans.65
Over 12 million retirees (thirty-two percent of all Medicare
beneficiaries) receive employer-backed health care benefits.'
Employers are dropping retiree health benefits every year:67 from
1988 to 2006, the number of large employers providing retiree
health benefits dropped from sixty-six percent to thirty-five
percent.' In a survey of large employers, the Kaiser Family
Foundation found that nine percent of employers cut health
58. See Moon, supra note 13, at 342-43 (describing Medigap as "very expensive"
and acknowledging that Medicaid may not adequately cover all low-income
Medicare beneficiaries).
59. See supra Part I.A.
60. See Moon, supra note 13, at 341-43.
61. Thirty-two percent of all Medicare beneficiaries in 2004 relied on employer-
backed retiree health benefits for supplemental health insurance. MEDPAC DATA,
supra note 53, at 62.
62. See id.; KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. See generally Rick Rewerts &
Elaine Davis, The Future of Retiree Health Care Benefits, 20 J. COMP. BENEFITS 6
(2004) (summarizing the history of employer-backed retiree health benefits in the
United States since the 1960s).
63. See KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
64. See, e.g., George F. Will, What Ails GM, WASH. POST, May 1, 2005, at B7.
65. See supra Part I.B.
66. KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1; MEDPAC DATA, supra note 53, at 62.
67. See KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
68. Id.
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benefits for future Medicare-eligible retirees from 2005 to 2006,
and ten percent were very likely to eliminate health benefits for
future retirees. 9 Employers are also shifting the costs of health
insurance onto retirees through increases in co-pays, co-insurance,
and deductibles.°
Employers have been cutting benefits for a variety of
reasons.7 Two obvious culprits are the increasing cost of domestic
health care and global business competition.72 The average cost of
health care for retirees rose 6.8 percent from 2005 to 2006, 73 and it
will continue to rise as more baby boomers retire.74 This increased
cost becomes especially burdensome when coupled with
competition from foreign firms enjoying national health care.75
The American automotive industry illustrates this problem: in
2005, General Motors had 4 billion dollars more in health care
costs than Toyota. 6 It is commonly reported that "legacy" retiree
benefits account for $1,525 of the price of every car sold by General
Motors. 7   This disparity in health care and other costs leaves
many domestic employers no choice but to reduce retiree health
benefits.
As employers reduce and eliminate retiree health benefits,
the state of health care for older people in the United States
69. Id. at 2, 19, 22. Specifically, 10% of surveyed employers said they were
.very or somewhat likely to terminate coverage for future retirees." Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 1, 19.
71. See generally Larry Grudzien, The Great Vanishing Benefit, Employer
Provided Retiree Medical Benefits: The Problem and Possible Solutions, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 785, 786 (2006) (attributing the decrease in employer-backed
retiree health benefits to "accounting issues, increased costs, international
competition, age discrimination issues, and lack of viable and flexible funding
vehicles for individuals, employees, and employers").
72. Id. at 790-91, 793-95.
73. KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 2, 11.
74. See supra Part I.A.
75. See Grudzien, supra note 71, at 793-95.
76. See Tom Walsh, GM's CEO Must Cope with Retiree Benefit Cost, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Apr. 20, 2005, at C1 (also noting that the UAW has been unable to
unionize the plants of Asian or European "implant" automakers in the United
States). This fact is significant as 86% of employers with a unionized workforce
provide retiree health benefits. KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 3.
77. See Will, supra note 64, at B7.
78. See Sholnn Freeman & Frank Ahrens, GM, Union Agree on Contract to End
Strike, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2007, at Al (discussing the current state of retiree
benefits in the American automotive industry); Will, supra note 64, at B7 (finding
that, although Toyota and many other foreign firms have manufacturing plants in
the United States, most of these are non-unionized); see also Steve Riczo, A System
in Crisis, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2006 (Magazine), at 70 (noting that Japan has a
national health insurance program, and that per capita health care costs in the
United States are more than double the per capita health care costs in Japan).
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becomes increasingly dismal.79  Medicare does not provide
adequate coverage on its own, so over ninety percent of Medicare
beneficiaries must use supplemental insurance."0 For the twelve
million older people in the United States who rely on employer-
backed retiree health benefits for this supplemental insurance,8
any decrease in benefits will trigger an outcry.
82
II. The Procedural History Surrounding AARP III
The issue in AARP v. EEOC' is whether an employer can
incorporate Medicare eligibility in determining retiree health
benefits without meeting the requirements in the ADEA. 4 This
case is best understood in the context of the amended language of
the ADEA,8" legal precedent,' and the administrative reactions to
both.87
A. Erie County and the Plain Language of the ADEA
The ADEA mandates that an employer providing benefits to
retirees must provide equal health benefits to all retirees,
regardless of age.' The plain language of section 4 of the ADEA
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of age.8'
Specifically, the statute reads: "It shall be unlawful for an
employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age. ..
79. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
80. See supra Part I.B.
81. See KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
82. See generally Freeman & Ahrens, supra note 78, at Al; Walsh, supra note
76, at Cl; Will, supra note 64, at B7.
83. AARP v. EEOC (AARP I!), 390 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (granting
relief from judgment), affd, AARP v. EEOC (AARP III), 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir.
2007); AARP v. EEOC (AARP 1), 383 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
84. AARP II1, 489 F.3d 558, 562 (3rd Cir. 2007).
85. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a),
623(f)(2), 628 (2000).
86. Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie (Erie County Retirees II), 220
F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000); Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie (Erie County
Retirees III), 140 F. Supp. 2d 466 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Erie County Retirees Ass'n v.
County of Erie (Erie County Retirees 1), 91 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
87. 72 Fed. Reg. 72944 (Dec. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1625.32); 68
Fed. Reg. 41542 (July 14, 2003).
88. See § 623(a).
89. See § 623(a); § 621(b) (describing the purpose of the ADEA: "to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment").
90. § 623(a)(1).
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In the early stages of ADEA enforcement, 9' the EEOC
interpreted "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" to
include fringe benefits.92 The regulations provided an "equal
benefit/equal cost" check, requiring an employer to either a) spend
the same amount on all retirees or b) provide the same benefit for
all retirees.93
In 1990, Congress codified this EEOC regulation when it
amended the ADEA by passing the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act ("OWBPA").94
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization . . . to take any action otherwise
prohibited .. .to observe the terms of a bona fide employee
benefit plan.., where, for each benefit or benefit package, the
actual amount of payment made or cost incurred on behalf of
an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on
behalf of a younger worker. 95
"Employee benefits" under the OWBPA includes retiree health
benefits within the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment."' Hence, the plain language of the ADEA now
considers a failure to meet the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement to constitute discrimination on the basis of age in the
context of retiree health benefits.97
An issue arises, however, in enforcing the "equal
benefit/equal cost" requirement when a retiree becomes eligible for
Medicare at age sixty-five.99 Before 2000, employers assumed that
coordinating an alteration in benefits with Medicare eligibility did
not violate the ADEA, relying on the OWBPA's legislative
history.' This assumption was challenged in 2000 with Erie
County Retirees Association v. Erie County,'° where retirees
91. The 2000 version of the Employee Benefits chapter of the EEOC
Compliance Manual, which references this policy, is available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html#B.%20Health%2OInsurance. See
EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 4(b) (2000) (rescinded August 20, 2001) (ADEA
Issues).
92. Id.
93. See § 623(f)(2)(B)(i).
94. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"), Pub. L. No. 101-433, §
102, 104 Stat. 978, 978 (1990) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 630).
95. § 623(f).
96. § 630(l).
97. § 623(a), (f)(2)(B)(i).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000).
99. See Statement of Managers, 135 Cong. Rec. S25353 (Sept. 24, 1990). See
generally Erie County Retirees 11, 220 F.3d 193, 205-08 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing
OWBPA's legislative history surrounding this issue).
100. Erie County Retirees 11, 220 F.3d 193; Erie County Retirees III, 140 F. Supp.
2d 466 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Erie County Retirees 1, 91 F. Supp. 2d 860 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
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eligible for Medicare brought a class action against their employer
for offering retirees over age sixty-five a lesser benefit package
than retirees under age sixty-five without meeting the "equal
benefit/equal cost" requirement.'0
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the county could
only escape age-discrimination liability under the ADEA if it could
meet the "equal benefit/equal cost" standard, and it remanded the
case to determine whether the standard had been met.10 2  On
remand, the lower court determined that the standard had not
been met. 103
The Third Circuit based its holding on textual interpretation,
relying primarily on the plain language of the ADEA.' °  Erie
County makes clear that an employer violates the plain language
of the ADEA when it reduces benefits for retirees who are eligible
for Medicare without meeting the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement. 05
B. The Effect of Erie County and the EEOC's Proposed
Exemption
The EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of the Erie County
retirees. 0 6 In its brief, the EEOC contended that the county
violated the ADEA and should be subject to the "equal
benefit/equal cost" requirement because Medicare eligibility was
an "age-defined factor" that directly contributed to discrimination
in benefit options. 107 After supporting the retirees in Erie County,
the EEOC adopted the Erie County court's position as its "national
enforcement policy. " "
Following the EEOC's adoption of the Erie County position,
many commentators anticipated that employers would respond by
terminating or reducing all benefits for retirees.,0o Because there
101. Erie County Retirees 11, 220 F.3d 193.
102. Id. at 216-17.
103. See Erie County Retirees III, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
104. See Erie County Retirees 11, 220 F.3d at 208-17.
105. See id. at 216-17.
106. Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. Erie County, 220 F.3d 193
(3d. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3877), 2000 WL 33983611.
107. "Medicare eligibility is, in part, an age-defined factor .... But for the fact
that they were Medicare eligible, the plaintiffs would not have been placed in the
allegedly inferior health plan." Id. at 5-6.
108. 68 Fed. Reg. 41542, 41545 n.25 (July 14, 2003).
109. See id. at 41546 n.27; Christopher Condeluci, Winning the Battle, but
Losing the War: Purported Age Discrimination May Discourage Employers from
Providing Retiree Medical Benefits, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 709, 715-16 (2002);
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is no legal duty to provide health benefits to retirees,"' employers
may prefer to drop or reduce all benefits rather than risk liability
under the ADEA for providing unequal benefits to retirees over
and under sixty-five."' Labor unions and employer groups also
feared this response.' This concern materialized in the aftermath
of Erie County; instead of increasing benefits for retirees over
sixty-five, the county instead reduced benefits for retirees under
sixty-five to match the benefits of the older retirees with
Medicare. "'
In response, the EEOC rescinded its Erie County policy and
began to study this problem in more detail."' The EEOC
determined that the "equal benefit/equal cost" regulation was
impractical because it was too cumbersome for employers to
calculate equal costs or benefits for the different groups of
retirees. 5 Determining that this requirement was irreconcilable
with the goal of maximizing benefits for all ages of retirees, the
EEOC reversed its position."' Exercising its authority under
section 9 of the ADEA to "establish such reasonable exemptions to
and from any or all provisions of this chapter as it may find
necessary and proper in the public interest," 7 the EEOC
published the following ADEA exemption for notice and comment
in 2003
§ 1625.32 Coordination of Retiree Health Benefits with
Medicare and State Health Benefits
(b) Some employee benefit plans provide health benefits for
retired participants that are altered, reduced or eliminated
when the participant is eligible for Medicare health benefits or
Grudzien, supra note 71, at 791-93.
110. The Supreme Court has explicitly said that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") does not require an employer to provide retiree
health benefits. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) ("Nothing in
ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor does ERISA
mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such
a plan.").
111. See sources cited supra note 109.
112. See Condeluci, supra note 109, at 754-58.
113. See, e.g., Grudzien, supra note 71, at 791-93 (describing age discrimination
issues as a cause for employers to reduce or eliminate retiree health benefits).
114. See 68 Fed. Reg. 41542 (July 14, 2003) (discussing the Erie County policy
and possible alernatives).
115. See id. at 41546-47.
116. See id. at 41546-47; see also Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the
Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 97-98 (2005) (discussing
different ideas of fairness and describing "the goal of nondiscrimination or fairness
for older persons in employer-sponsored health coverage" as just "one goal to be
balanced against others").
117. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
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for health benefits under a comparable State health benefit
plan. . . . [I]t is hereby found necessary and proper in the
public interest to exempt from all prohibitions of the Act such
coordination of retiree health benefits with Medicare or a
comparable State health benefit plan."8
The exemption allows employers to incorporate Medicare
eligibility into a benefits determination without meeting the
"equal benefit/equal cost" or other provision in the ADEA-a
complete reversal from the EEOC's former position on this issue."'
C. The AARP Challenge and the Effect of Brand X on
Judicial Review of Administrative Statutory
Interpretation
AARP sued the EEOC and was granted an injunction in
AARP I.120 After AARP I, the Supreme Court altered the rule for
judicial review of an administrative statutory interpretation in
National Cable Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services (Brand X),121 granting more deference to the agency's
interpretation when it conflicts with a prior judicial ruling.'22 The
district court then applied the new standard and vacated its
earlier judgment for AARP (AARP II), but stayed the injunction
pending an appeal by AARP."2 ' AARP promptly appealed (AARP
III).124
1. AARP I and the Chevron Test of Administrative
Interpretation of a Statute: A Victory for AARP
Before the EEOC's exemption was codified, AARP sued the
EEOC.' 2' AARP challenged the EEOC's authority to make its
exemption to the ADEA, given the outcome of Erie County to the
contrary.' 6 The district court granted an injunction prohibiting
the EEOC's exemption, relying on Erie County precedent" 7 and
the test for judicial review of an administrative interpretation of a
statute articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
118. 68 Fed. Reg. at 45148-49.
119. Id. at 45148.
120. AARP 1, 383 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
121. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
122. Id. at 983.
123. AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 448-62 (E.D. Pa. 2005), affd, AARP III, 489
F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007).
124. AARP III, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007).
125. AARP I, 383 F. Supp. 2d 705.
126. Id. at 706.
127. Id. (citing Erie County Retirees H, 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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v. Natural Resources Defense Council.'
In Chevron, the Court considered an interpretation of
statutory language by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA").'29 The Court articulated the two-step test now commonly
used to review an agency's interpretation of a statute.13' Step one
asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." 3 ' If so, the inquiry ends and the agency must
give effect to congressional intent.32 If there is no expressed
intent or if the intent is ambiguous, then the test proceeds to step
two, in which the court asks if the agency's interpretation is
"based on a permissible construction of the statute."3 If it is, then
the administrative construction of the statute stands. "4
The court in AARP I held that the EEOC's proposed
exemption violated the plain language of the ADEA as interpreted
by the Third Circuit in Erie County.' The court rejected the
EEOC's contention that its grant of authority under section 9 of
the ADEA to "establish such reasonable exemptions ... as it may
find necessary and proper in the public interest" allowed the
exemption for three reasons. 13  First, the court noted that an
administrative agency cannot contradict congressional intent and
that the Erie County court had already determined that Congress
did not intend this practice under the ADEA. '31 Second, the court
found that the EEOC's interpretation would "render meaningless
the first step of Chevron" if the substantive provisions of a statute
were ignored and only the grant of authority to an agency was
considered. 38  Last, the court determined that the grant of
authority may only be applicable in situations regarding "explicit,
or implicit, gaps that Congress left in the ADEA.""3 ' The court,
citing Erie County's finding of congressional intent, found no gaps
128. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
129. Id. at 840.
130. Id. at 842-43.
131. Id. at 842.
132. Id. at 843.
133. Id.
134. Id. See generally Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative
State: The Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing that criticism of the Chevron doctrine is
misplaced, and the courts should accept an agency's power to interpret ambiguous
statutes).
135. AARPI, 383 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
136. See id. at 710; see also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
137. AARPI, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 710.




in this portion of the ADEA, and thus the EEOC exemption
exceeded its grant of authority. 140
Central to the AARP I court's reasoning is the doctrine of
stare decisis, the binding nature of judicial precedent.14 ' Based
primarily on the Erie County court's determination that Congress
did not intend for employers to reduce benefits with Medicare
eligibility without meeting the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement, the AARP I court granted summary judgment for




2. The Change in Deference with Brand X and AARP
I: A Victory for the EEOC
After the court's decision in AARP I, the Supreme Court
changed the judicial standard of review of an administrative
statutory interpretation.'43 It altered the Chevron test in Brand X,
granting more deference to a subsequent agency's interpretation
that follows a prior judicial ruling. 4 1 In Brand X, the Supreme
Court considered the Federal Communications Commission's
("FFC's") interpretation of a statute.145 In applying Chevron, the
Court determined that "[o]nly a judicial precedent holding that the
statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and
therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction.""' The Court reasoned it was "for
agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps."'47  Justice Scalia
dissented, claiming this new interpretation undermined stare
decisis. ' "Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that can
be reversed or ignored by Executive officers."
14
140. Id.
141. "Once a court has determined a statute's meaning, the court must adhere to
that prior ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis and assess an agency's later
interpretation of the statute against that settled law." Id. at 709.
142. Id. at 711-12 (citing Erie County Retirees 1, 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000)).




146. Id. at 982-83.
147. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 & n.ll (1984)).
148. Id. at 1017 (Scalia J., dissenting).
149. Id.; see Thomas E. Zahn, Settled No More: An Administrative Agency May
Overturn Prior Judicial Interpretation of a Statute Within Its Jurisdiction So Long
as the Statutory Language Is Ambiguous, 8 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 143 (2006) (arguing that
the majority's position is incorrect). But see Doug Geyser, Courts Still "Say What
the Law Is": Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X,
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The court in AARP H promptly recognized the increased
deference Brand X gave to an administrative interpretation of
statutory language. 5 ° The AARP H court construed Brand X to
mean that a prior judicial ruling forecloses a subsequent
administrative interpretation "unless the court holds that its
interpretation is the only permissible, not merely the best,
construction of the statute.".1 After altering its application of the
Chevron test, the court determined that the Medicare issue in Erie
County was a gap in the ADEA that Congress intended the EEOC
to fill.'52 The court concluded that the Erie County construction of
the ADEA was not the statute's "only permissible meaning" and
that the EEOC's exemption satisfied both parts of the Chevron test
as altered by Brand X.15
3
The procedural history leading up to AARP III reflects
significant changes in the interpretation of the ADEA, the role of
the EEOC in enforcing and regulating under the ADEA, and the
Chevron analysis of administrative statutory interpretation. The
AARP III court would reach the same result as in AARP H, but
through a different analysis and construction of the Chevron
test. '54
III. AARP v. EEOC (AARP III)
A. The Exemption Is Within the EEOC's Authority Under
the ADEA
In AARP III, AARP appealed the AARP H court's decision.155
The court defined the "precise question" in AARP III as "whether
the EEOC ha[d] the power to issue a regulation exempting from
the prohibitions of the ADEA" the practice of incorporating
Medicare eligibility into determinations of employer-sponsored
retiree health benefits.'56 In determining that the EEOC had the
requisite authority to make the exemption, the court looked to the
plain language in section 9 of the ADEA, which grants rulemaking
authority to the EEOC.5 7 "By stating that 'any or all provisions'
106 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2151-52 (2006) (arguing Justice Scalia's concerns are
misplaced).
150. AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
151. Id. at 447.
152. Id. at 454.
153. See id. at 448-62.
154. AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 562-65 (2007).
155. Id at 558-59.
156. Id. at 563.
157. Id. at 563; see also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
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may be subject to exemptions, Congress made plain its intent to
allow limited practices not otherwise permitted under the
statute."5 Responding to AARP's contention that the exemptions
exceeded the EEOC's authority, the court again invoked the plain
language of section 9 of the ADEA and described the EEOC's
exemption as appropriately "limited.""' In a footnote, the court
maintained that the exemption did not effectively repeal a portion
of the ADEA because "the proposed regulation at issue is narrowly
focused and not contrary to the terms and purpose of the ADEA."'6 °
The court went on to discuss the Chevron two-step analysis,
determining that, "[u]nder Chevron step one, Congress' express
intent to permit such exemptions under section 9 of the ADEA
must be given effect; it is unnecessary to proceed to step two."
1 61
By holding that no statutory gaps or ambiguity needed to exist in
the statute for the EEOC to exercise its authority to make an
exemption, the court did not reach the issue of Brand X. 62 Unlike
AARP H, the court in AARP III discussed congressional intent
exclusively in terms of the EEOC's power under section 9 of the
ADEA.'6
B. The Exemption Meets the Requirements of the APA
The court then addressed a number of issues raised by AARP
under the APA, an act that invalidates any administrative action
that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."" The first challenge by AARP was
substantive. AARP asserted that the EEOC disregarded a
regulation stating that an exemption must be "exercised with
caution and due regard for the remedial purpose of the statute."
1 65
The court rejected this challenge, finding the EEOC's exemption to
be "narrowly drawn" and "reasonable."" Similarly, the court
dismissed AARP's contention that the exemption should be
invalidated for representing a change in agency policy
unsupported by existing law because, the court found, the
exemption was drawn on a "reasoned analysis for change."
1 67
158. AARP III, 489 F.3d at 564.
159. Id. at 563-64.
160. Id. at 563 n.5.
161. Id. at 565.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 563-65; AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
164. AARP III, 489 F.3d at 565-67 (quoting APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).
165. Id. at 566 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1627.15(b) (2007)).
166. Id. at 566.
167. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
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The court then turned to procedural concerns raised by
AARP. ' Citing the EEOC's notice of proposed regulation, the
court first rejected AARP's claim that the EEOC failed to "consider
all relevant factors and possible alternatives in proposing the
exemption."'69 Next, the court dismissed the assertion that the
EEOC failed to consider the "effect on all workers" because the
EEOC explicitly recognized the potential detriment to certain
classes.17°  The court also rejected AARP's third procedural
objection that the EEOC did not consider all alternatives. Here,
the court cited a lengthy discussion of the "equal benefit/equal
cost" provision in the EEOC's proposed exemption. 7' Last, AARP
asserted that the EEOC provided inadequate information during
the notice and comment period under the APA, which the court
rejected based on the plain language of the APA, which requires
only "general notice." 72
After the court rejected AARP's challenges based on Chevron
and the APA, it affirmed AARP II and lifted the injunction against
implementation of the EEOC's exemption.'73 The EEOC published
the final rule on December 26, 2007, reinforcing its position in the
2003 rule proposal and including commentary on the AARP
litigation, but without substantially changing the language of the
rule. ' The Supreme Court denied AARP's petition for a writ of
certiorari on March 24, 2008.17
IV. AARP III and the Effective Repeal of ADEA Protections:
Problems and Potential Solutions
The judicial reasoning in AARP III leaves much to be desired.
First, section 9 of the ADEA only grants the EEOC limited
administrative power to make exemptions; the EEOC does not
have the power to effectively repeal the central purpose of the
statute. 76 Second, the court prematurely dismissed the "equal
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-42 (1983)).
168. Id. at 566.
169. Id. at 566-67.
170. Id. at 567.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000)).
173. Id. at 567-68.
174. 72 Fed. Reg. 72938-01 (Dec. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625,
1627). See generally Robert Pear, Many Retirees May Lose Benefit from Employers,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2007, at Al (discussing the EEOC's ruling and its impact on
retirees).
175. AARP v. EEOC, No. 07-662, 2008 WL 754343 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (denying
certiorari).
176. See AARP III, 489 F.3d. at 563 n.5 (citing United States v. Shumway, 199
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benefit/equal cost," anti-discrimination check, or variations
serving the same purpose, while decreasing the burden to
employers.'77 Third, the court misapplied the Chevron7 " test by
ignoring congressional intent behind the ADEA. 7 9 Fourth, the
court did not adequately address at least two of AARP's additional
concerns under the APA: restrictions on the EEOC's authority to
make exemptions to the ADEA and the EEOC's failure to consider
other alternatives. 8 ° Despite the court's limited capacity to solve
the immediate problem, there are possible solutions to this issue
beyond the scope of a single judicial decision.'8
A. Section 9 of the ADEA: A Limited Rulemaking Power
The plain language of section 9 of the ADEA grants the
EEOC the power to make "reasonable" exemptions to the ADEA
that are "necessary and proper in the public interest."18 2 While
noting that "no administrative agency is permitted to effectively
repeal any portion of a statute by regulation,"8 ' the AARP III
court upheld the EEOC's proposed exemption, citing section 9 of
the ADEA.' The exemption does not, however, satisfy the
reasonableness limitation in section 9 of the ADEA because it
effectively repeals the central purpose of the ADEA, allowing
employers to discriminate against older retirees.""'
In AARP III, the court said, "by stating that 'any or all
provisions' may be subject to exemptions, Congress made plain its
F.3d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)).
177. See id. at 567.
178. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
179. See AARP III, 489 F.3d. at 563; see also AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 452
n.11 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("The Supreme Court has never decided whether an agency's
interpretation of the scope of its own statutory authority is entitled to Chevron
deference."); AARP 1, 383 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (maintaining that to
narrow the scope of Chevron's first prong to an analysis of whether the EEOC has
the power to make the exemption would "render meaningless the first step of
Chevron").
180. See AARP III, 489 F.3d at 566-67.
181. See, e.g., Grudzien, supra note 71, at 803-25 (offering possible solutions to
the "great vanishing benefit" of employer-backed retiree health benefits); SERED &
FERNANDOPULLE, supra note 19, at 184-94 (proposing several options to increase
health care coverage in the United States).
182. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
183. AARP III, 489 F.3d. at 563 n.5.
184. See id. at 563-64.
185. See § 621(b); 68 Fed. Reg. 41542, 41548 (July 14, 2003). The exemption
provides no way to regulate fairness in the distribution of employer-sponsored
retiree health benefits for retirees of different ages, leaving the door open for age
discrimination expressly prohibited by the ADEA.
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intent to allow limited practices not otherwise permitted under the
statute."' 6 The court characterized the EEOC's proposed rule as a
"narrow exemption" focused solely on the employer practice of
coordinating retiree benefits with Medicare eligibility."'8 Employer
"coordination of retiree health benefits with Medicare,"'" however,
affects all retirees because every American is automatically
enrolled in Medicare Part A upon turning sixty-five.'89  The
EEOC's proposal, therefore, is not a "narrow exemption" to a
provision of the ADEA, but it is effectively a repeal of a key piece
of anti-discrimination legislation.
Through its proposed exemption to the ADEA, the EEOC
effectively repeals the portion of the ADEA barring age
discrimination in employer-sponsored health benefits. The
EEOC's exemption not only removes the "equal benefit/equal cost"
check against age discrimination, but it removes any regulation of
employer-sponsored, retiree health benefits whatsoever. An
agency may not effectively repeal a portion of a statute through
regulation. 90 This tenet is central to the doctrine of separation of
powers;.'. it is for the legislature, not an executive agency, to draft
and repeal laws.'92
In a country with high health care costs and a rapidly
growing older population, it is not "reasonable" to effectively
repeal a statute that protects against age discrimination in the
area of health benefits. 93 Thirty-four percent of elderly Medicare
beneficiaries rely on employer-sponsored retiree health insurance
186. AARP III, 489 F.3d at 563.
187. Id. at 565. Likewise, the court found that the exemption did not run afoul
of the "delegation doctrine," in which Congress may permit the controlling agency a
degree of legislative authority limited to the "intelligible principle" of a statute,
because the EEOC's exemption was "narrowly focused to permit a discrete practice
pursuant to the purposes of the ADEA." See id. at 565 n.6.
188. 68 Fed. Reg. at 41548.
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (2000).
190. See United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Administrative agencies lack authority effectively to repeal the statute by
regulations.").
191. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8 (granting "[aill legislative Powers" to
Congress, including the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers"). See generally
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(outlining the separation of powers doctrine, specifically as it applies to limits on
the lawmaking powers of the executive branch).
192. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
But see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(discussing the deference agencies have in interpreting a statute).
193. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the high cost of health care).
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to supplement Medicare and meet their health care needs.' A
competitive, global market compels employers to cut costs;' 95
removing any regulation of employer-sponsored retiree health
benefits conflicts with the congressional intent of the ADEA to
encourage the employment of older workers."'9 Although it may be
prudent to reward employers who provide health benefits to
retirees, it is not "reasonable" to abandon all safeguards against
age discrimination in this area."'
The proposed exemption goes beyond the EEOC's rulemaking
authority under the ADEA."99 By effectively repealing the anti-
discriminatory purpose of the ADEA, the EEOC violates the plain
language of the statute'99 and the separation of powers doctrine." °
B. The Equal Benefit/Equal Cost Concept: A Necessary
Check
The "equal benefit/equal cost" concept in the ADEA provides
a necessary check against age discrimination in employment
compensation, which includes retiree health benefits.' 0 1 Neither
the EEOC nor the AARP III court provides sufficient justification
to warrant dismissal of this check against age discrimination. It is
not unreasonable to require employers to accommodate a variation
of the "equal benefit/equal cost" requirement when creating health
benefit packages for retired employees.
The EEOC's primary concern regarding the "equal
benefit/equal cost" requirement is that it is impracticable for
employers to calculate the "cost" or "benefit" of Medicare.' 9" The
EEOC cited a "multitude of variables, including types of plans,
levels and types of coverage, deductibles, and geographical areas
covered," 3 and the "subjective nature of some health benefits"2"
in concluding that the "cost" of health insurance cannot easily be
194. KAISER REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78 (discussing the fact that
employers are saving money by reducing health benefits).
196. See H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 1 (1967); see also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)
(2000).
197. See § 623(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on age).
198. See id. § 628 (giving the Secretary of Labor the right to issue necessary or
appropriate rules and regulations and to establish reasonable exemptions).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
200. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
201. See § 623(f)(2)(B)(i).
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calculated." Similarly, the EEOC determined that it is
impracticable for an employer to calculate its "cost" of providing
health insurance because "the government's cost [of providing]
Medicare services does not reflect what similar benefits would cost
an employer in the marketplace." °6 Additionally, it is difficult
because an employer's tax obligation pursuant to the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act... is not representative because most
employees change jobs throughout their careers and also because
employees pay for a part of Medicare themselves. 8 The AARP III
court deferred to the EEOC's judgment and did not question the
EEOC's conclusion that the "equal benefit/equal cost" requirement
is too burdensome for employers.2"
Although the EEOC raised significant issues warranting
close consideration, there are some variations of the statutory
"equal benefit/equal cost" rule that can serve the same purpose
while imposing a lighter burden on employers. For example,
removing the individualized, case-by-case nature of the
requirement would significantly reduce the impracticability of this
check.210 Instead of individually accommodating each retiree, an
employer could collectively incorporate an average "cost" of
Medicare for retirees within a certain age cohort.2 1' Moreover, the
EEOC could calculate and distribute the quantitative value of
Medicare "cost" to employers each year, nearly removing the
burden on employers all together." In determining this "cost" of
Medicare, the EEOC could incorporate the entirety of Part A and
an average of the Parts B and D services utilized by retirees with
employer-sponsored benefits.' The EEOC could then translate
the federal government's cost of services provided by Medicare to a
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-28 (2000).
FICA mandates that an employer withhold tax for Medicare from the wages of
every employee. Id.
208. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 41546.
209. See AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2007). While considering AARP's
challenges under the APA, the court deferred to the EEOC's judgment regarding
the "equal benefit/equal cost" rule. See id.; see also infra Part IV.D.
210. AARP III, 489 F.3d at 567 (discussing the difficulty of calculating retiree
health costs and benefits for individuals).
211. For example, the "cost" of Medicare could be calculated for separate cohorts
of retirees aged sixty-five to seventy, seventy-one to seventy-five, and so on.
212. For instance, the EEOC could adjust its calculations based on the increased
cost of health care annually. The existing retirees' plans could be adjusted less
frequently, such as every three or five years, to decrease the burden on employers.
213. See supra Part I.B. for a discussion of the benefits, costs, and coverage of
Medicare Parts A through D.
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comparable value for an employer in the marketplace. The EEOC
could then limit the number of variables accordingly, focusing on
more quantifiable values, such as deductibles or co-pays.214 Once
employers are given the average dollar value for retirees within a
certain age group, adjusting a health plan accordingly to avoid age
discrimination becomes significantly less burdensome. 1'
This proposal is one possible variation of the "equal
benefit/equal cost" rule that could balance employer convenience
with fairness to all retirees.2 ' Incorporating some flexibility into a
variation of the "equal benefit/equal cost" rule maintains the
integrity of the requirement as a safeguard against age
discrimination consistent with congressional intent, while at the
same time decreasing the burden on employers. Both the AARP
III court and the EEOC were too hasty in dismissing this
requirement and potential variations."7
C. The Court's Misapplication of the Chevron Test
In addition to failing to recognize the EEOC's proposed
exemption as an effective repeal of the ADEA21 ' and failing to
consider reasonable variations to the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement,"' the AARP III court misapplied the Chevron test.22°
Congress has "directly spoken"221 to this issue by passing the
substantive anti-discriminatory provisions of the ADEA.222 By
selectively applying step one of the Chevron analysis to only
portions of the ADEA, the court sidestepped the remainder of the
Chevron test. Because, as argued above, the EEOC's proposal fails
214. If the EEOC limits the variables used and simplifies this process to achieve
only an average or estimated cost for a general group of retirees, it can no longer
maintain that "retiree health costs or benefits [cannot] be reasonably quantified in
a regulation." 68 Fed. Reg. 41542, 41546 (July 14, 2003).
215. See id. (describing the burden on employers as primarily due to the complex
nature of calculating the "cost" or "benefit").
216. Additional cost-saving alternatives may include: resources or guidelines
from the EEOC to help employers accommodate the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement, decreased recordkeeping requirements for employers, an incentive
program for employees to exercise optional waiver of the "equal benefit/equal cost"
requirement, and restrictions on potential causes of action by employees, unions, or
employee groups for a violation of this requirement.
217. The EEOC did not publicly consider any variations of the rule before
dismissing it. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 41546-47. Likewise, the AARP III court did not
enter into a discussion of variations on the rule which could accommodate both
interests. See AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 566-67 (3d Cir. 2007).
218. See supra Part V.A.
219. See supra Part IV.B.
220. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
221. Id. at 842.
222. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
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the first step of the Chevron test, 2 3 the court should have
considered Chevron step two as well.2 4
The first part of the Chevron test asks "whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue," and it rejects
any administrative statutory interpretation contrary to clearly
expressed congressional intent.22 In the present case, Congress
has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue"2 7 not only by
granting the EEOC the ability to make reasonable exemptions,228
but also by explicitly prohibiting age discrimination in an
employer's distribution of retiree health benefits.229
In AARP III, the court considered only portions of the
congressional intent behind the ADEA, ignoring the overarching
purpose. 2 ' The AARP III court determined that the "precise
question" at issue was "whether the EEOC has the power to issue
a regulation exempting from the prohibitions of the ADEA
employer-sponsored benefits plans that coordinate retiree health
benefits with eligibility for Medicare or state-sponsored health
benefits programs."2 1 As the court in AARP I and H asserted, a
reading this narrow will always satisfy the first step of Chevron.232
A Chevron inquiry, by definition, regards the scope of
administrative authority to interpret a particular statute.233  If
Chevron's "precise question" is focused solely on the congressional
grant of authority to an agency, the agency will always be entitled
to deference via the provision of the statute authorizing the agency
to create the regulation in the first place.2 4 The court should not
have adopted reasoning that "render[s] meaningless the first step
of Chevron."35
223. AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2007).
224. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (articulating the second prong of the test).
225. Id. at 842.
226. Id. at 842-43.
227. Id. at 842.
228. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
229. § 623(f)(2)(B).
230. See AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2007).
231. Id.
232. See AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 452 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 2005); AARP I, 383 F.
Supp. 2d 705, 711 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (maintaining that to reduce step one of Chevron
to an analysis of whether the EEOC has the power to make the exemption would
render the first step meaningless).
233. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
234. See AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 452 n.11. The court also noted: "The
Supreme Court has never decided whether an agency's interpretation of the scope
of its own statutory authority is entitled to Chevron deference." Id.
235. AARPI, 383 F. Supp. 2d. at 711.
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The AARP III court construed the "precise question" as it did
because the EEOC's exemption would likely fail the first step of
Chevron test under the appropriate formulation of the "precise
question." Congress did not delegate authority to the EEOC to
decide whether an employer can circumvent the anti-
discrimination protections of the ADEA when incorporating
Medicare eligibility into a health benefits package. 36 Chevron step
two, whether the EEOC's rule is "based on a permissible
construction of the statute," warrants consideration.3 7 This, in
turn, leads to a Chevron analysis under the new Brand X
standard. 38 Although the same conclusion as that in AARP 11239
could have been reached under such an analysis, the AARP III
court failed to address this question because it did not adequately
formulate or execute the Chevron doctrine. 4 °
D. The Court's Premature Rejection of AARP's Challenges
Under the APA
In AARP III, the court also considered several objections
raised by AARP under the APA."4' The APA calls for invalidation
of any administrative regulation that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."4 '
Although the court's dismissal of several of these points may be
warranted, two points merit further consideration. 4 '
AARP first contended that the EEOC acted arbitrarily by
disregarding another EEOC regulation calling for "caution and
due regard for the remedial purpose of the [ADEA]" throughout
236. See id. at 709-10.
237. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
238. Nat'l Cable Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967
(2005). In AARP II, the court read Brand X to hold that a prior judicial ruling
forecloses a subsequent administrative interpretation only "if the court has
determined the only permissible meaning of the statute." AARP H, 390 F. Supp. 2d
at 442.
239. The AARP II court found the EEOC's proposed exemption was not
foreclosed by Erie County Retirees H, and thus was not in direct conflict with
expressed congressional intent, nor in violation of Chevron's step one. Id. at 454-
55.
240. See AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 562-65 (3d Cir. 2007). More specifically, the
court asked the wrong "precise question" and applied congressional intent
selectively, ignoring the intent surrounding the anti-discriminatory provisions of
the ADEA.
241. Id. at 565-67 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).
242. § 706(2)(A).
243. See AARP III, 489 F.3d at 565-67; supra Part III.B (discussing the court's
response to AARP's challenges under the APA).
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the rulemaking process." ' The court quickly dismissed AARP's
claim, citing again the "narrowly drawn" nature of the EEOC's
proposed exemption..2 " As discussed previously, the EEOC's
exemption is not "narrowly drawn" because it affects every retiree
who turns sixty-five and every employer providing benefits for
retirees over the age of sixty-five. 46 The "remedial purpose" of the
ADEA is to guard against age discrimination in employment.247
Although encouraging employers to provide retiree health benefits
runs congruent with the principles of the ADEA, it is not the
primary "remedial purpose" of the statute.2 The court did not
adequately address AARP's claim regarding the loss of protection
against age discrimination suffered under the EEOC's
exemption. 49
AARP's next contention, that "the EEOC acted arbitrarily by
failing to consider . . . possible alternatives in proposing the
exemption," was also dismissed too readily by the court.2 50  The
court specifically discussed the "equal benefit/equal cost" provision
and maintained that the EEOC sufficiently considered this
alternative to the exemption. 21' As discussed previously, 2 2 the
EEOC did not substantially address in a public manner the
potential variations to this provision before concluding that
"relying solely on this approach would be impractical or
impossible."5 3 The court again deferred to the EEOC and did not
question the EEOC's choice to abandon a necessary check against
254age discrimination.
244. AARP III, 489 F.3d at 565-67 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1627.15(b) (2007)).
245. Id. at 566.
246. See supra text accompanying note 189.
247. This is evidenced by the title of the legislation, the "Age Discrimination in
Employment Act." ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 1, 81 Stat. 602, 602 (1967).
248. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 8
(1967) (the purpose of the ADEA is "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment, and to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment").
249. The court addressed this concern earlier in the opinion, stating "[wie
recognize with some dismay that the proposed exemption may allow employers to
reduce health benefits to retirees over the age of sixty-five while maintaining
greater benefits for younger retirees," but "the EEOC has shown that this narrow
exemption ... will likely benefit all retirees." AARP III, 489 F.3d at 565. The court
did not directly address this concern again but continued to refer to the "narrowly
drawn" nature of the EEOC's exemption to justify dismissal of AARP's concerns
about age discrimination. Id. at 565-67.
250. Id. at 566.
251. Id.
252. See supra Part III.B.




Throughout its discussion of AARP's concerns under the
APA, the court engaged in a sort of unannounced balancing test,
weighing the value of age discrimination safeguards against the
value of encouraging employers to provide health benefits to
retirees.255  This is evidenced by the court's consistent
characterization of the EEOC's exemption as "narrowly drawn"
and the subsequent inevitable dismissal of concerns regarding the
true purpose of the ADEA and possible alternatives to the
exemption.5 6 Although such an approach may be prudent, 57 it
results in a failure to fully address AARP's concerns regarding age
discrimination within established standards of judicial review."'6
E. Solutions and Alternatives to the EEOC's Effective
Repeal of Protections Under the ADEA
Although the EEOC's stated intent to maximize the total
amount of health benefits for all retirees is commendable, the
EEOC cannot effectively repeal anti-discrimination legislation."9
By supporting the EEOC's action, the AARP III court undermined
the ADEA and gave employers the option of discriminating against
older retirees, who can be more costly to insure. 6 ° Instead of
repeatedly deferring to the EEOC's judgment, the court should
have objectively reviewed the EEOC's and AARP's points within
an established judicial framework."' A better solution resides
with Congress and reformation of the current system of health
262care for older people in the United States.
1. Solutions and Alternatives Available to the Court
There were limited alternatives available to the court in
AARP III because the ideal solution to this problem is legislative.
255. Id. at 565-67.
256. Id.
257. See Crossley, supra note 116, at 106-07 (discussing the "balancing test"
inherent in dialogue concerning health insurance).
258. The APA does not call for a balancing test weighing the benefits of a
regulation with the purpose of a statute, but for a determination of whether an
agency acted appropriately in constructing the regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000).
259. See supra Part IV.A (arguing the EEOC's exemption effectively repeals
parts of the ADEA).
260. Although an employer may need to provide full benefits for a retiree under
sixty-five not yet eligible for Medicare, older retirees generally have greater health
care needs than younger retirees. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part IV.A-D (discussing problems with the court's reasoning in
AARP III, specifically the characterization of the EEOC's proposal as "narrowly
drawn").
262. See supra notes 191-92(discussing the separation of powers doctrine and
congressional legislative authority).
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Notwithstanding a compromise, either option available to the
court had a negative consequence, be it a potential reduction in
retiree health benefits resulting from an employer's fear of liability
under the ADEA 63 or the sacrifice of a powerful and necessary
check against age discrimination in retiree health benefits. The
court should not, however, have focused on the outcome of its
decision, but rather on applying the appropriate tests of judicial
review to the objections raised by AARP, particularly regarding
the Chevron doctrine.
The court should have reached its solution by respecting
limitations on the EEOC's rulemaking authority, exploring
variations on the "equal benefit/equal cost" requirement, applying
the appropriate formulation of the Chevron test, and adequately
considering AARP's objections under the APA. These areas for
improvement in the court's reasoning center around the Chevron
test. Had the court articulated the Chevron test appropriately,
AARP's concerns regarding the EEOC's rulemaking authority, the
"equal benefit/equal cost" requirement, and the APA would have
also been adequately considered.264
The court should have framed Chevron step one, "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"265 by
considering the entirety of the ADEA and not exclusively the
EEOC's regulatory authority under section 9 of the ADEA. In
Chevron itself, for example, the Court considered the statutory
language and the legislative history of the Clean Air Act to
evaluate the validity of the EPA's regulation.266 Likewise, the
Court in Brand X inquired into the language of the
Communications Act beyond the grant of authority to the FFC to
determine whether the FCC's regulation was valid.267 Such a
broad inquiry should have been similarly applied in this case; the
AARP III court should have asked if Congress "explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill" in the ADEA regarding the coordination of
263. This was the outcome after the court in Erie County Retirees 11, 220 F.3d
193 (3d Cir. 2000), upheld the "equal benefit/equal cost" regulation. See supra Part
II.B.
264. The court's formulation of Chevron step one, inquiring no further than
section 9 of the ADEA, gives the court the means to readily dismiss AARP's other
contentions simply by citing section 9. See AARP III, 489 F.3d 558, 563-67 (3d Cir.
2007).
265. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
266. Id. at 859-66 (using statutory language, legislative history, and policy
concerns to consider the EPA's regulation).
267. Nat'l Cable Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,




retiree health benefits with Medicare, not whether the EEOC had
the authority to make the regulation under section 9. To
determine this, the court should have considered the totality of the
ADEA, balancing the language in section 9 with the other
substantive provisions of the ADEA.
Under this more contextualized application of the Chevron
doctrine, the court would have been forced to apply a higher level
of scrutiny to the other aspects of its inquiry into the EEOC's
regulation. AARP's separation of powers challenge, dismissed in a
footnote. 8 in the AARP III opinion, would have required an in-
depth discussion. Additionally, the court would have inquired
more thoroughly into the "equal benefit/equal cost" requirement
and potential variations and AARP's other contentions under the
APA.
The AARP III court's decision allowing the EEOC's
exemption enables an employer to freely reduce or drop benefits
for older retirees who may not be able to afford supplemental
insurance necessary to meet their health care needs."9 Because
the level of deference awarded to an agency in the Chevron
analysis is a high threshold for any challenger to overcome,27 ° it is
unlikely that the court could have reached a solution satisfying
2711AARP even through balanced judicial review and reasoning.
Future courts addressing this problem should not, however, follow
the Third Circuit's spotty judicial analysis in AARP III that
undermines the plain language of the ADEA, the separation of
powers doctrine, the Chevron doctrine, and the APA.
2. Solutions and Alternatives Available to Congress
The AARP III court was presented with a problem it did not
have the means, expertise, or authority to fix. Congress can,
however, address the crisis of inadequate health care for older
people in the United States by lowering the costs of health care
through price controls on prescription drugs and regulation of
other health care services, increasing the coverage of Medicare to
268. See 489 F.3d at 563 n.5.
269. The situation becomes particularly dire when an older retiree who loses his
or her employer-sponsored health benefits cannot afford private or Medicaid
supplementary insurance, but does not qualify for Medicaid assistance either. See
supra Part I.B through I.C.
270. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer...').
271. If a ready solution existed, it presumably would have been found during the
seven years of litigation regarding this issue.
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decrease older people's reliance on supplemental insurance,
lowering the age of Medicare eligibility so employers are less
burdened by retirees who have not qualified for Medicare, or
abandoning the current hybrid system in favor of a national health
care coverage system.
The most obvious solution to this problem is to lower the cost
of health care for retirees and thus reduce retiree dependency on
employer-sponsored health benefits. There is no good reason that
health care costs more in the United States than in other
nations.272 Other nations bargain with pharmaceutical companies
to reduce the cost of prescription drugs for their citizenries."7 '
Congress should bargain with these same companies so that older
Americans can stop paying two to three times as much for
prescription drugs as similar cohorts in other countries. 74
Additional methods for lowering the cost of health care to the
consumer may include reducing administrative costs and
regulating the costs of particular health care services.
Another, more cumbersome solution lies in reforming
Medicare services provided under Parts A and B and age
requirements. If Medicare covered more health care services,
particularly dental, hearing, vision, and increased hospital and
medical services, then older retirees would rely less on employer-
sponsored supplemental health insurance. Similarly, if the age for
Medicare eligibility were lowered, employers would have to worry
less about providing full health benefits to retirees under the age
of Medicare eligibility. 22 Neither of these options is feasible,
however, without corresponding revenue reform as Medicare has
limited resources and will soon become insolvent.276
The final, and most radical, solution to this issue involves the
implementation of a national, universal health coverage system
that fully meets the health care needs of older people in the United
States, as well as the forty-seven million uninsured Americans
272. See generally supra text accompanying notes 19-24 (describing the higher
cost of health care in the United States compared with other nations).
273. CASSEL, supra note 17, at 5.
274. Id. at 5.
275. See id. at 108 (proposing that the age of Medicare eligibility be lowered).
"Presently, many people neglect their health needs in their early sixties in order to
postpone treatment until age sixty-five, when they become eligible for Medicare.
Assuring health-care access to this group might reduce overall costs and improve
the health for those at higher risk." Id.
276. See MEDPAC DATA, supra note 53, at 11. Medicare is in a financial crisis:
the Part A hospital insurance ("HI") trust fund is projected to be exhausted by
2019, and the Board of Trustees have issued a "Medicare Funding Warning" to
Congress. TRS.' ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 14, 29-39.
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under age sixty-five.2" This idea has been popular among
politicians for the past century, but has never gained enough
momentum to materialize.278 Possible ways to begin this process
include: expanding the existing Medicaid program, implementing
a federal voucher program, creating a reinsurance plan/premium
rebate pool, and providing tax credits against the purchase of
private insurance.279 Although costs associated with implementing
a universal system would no doubt be high, abandoning the
employer-based, hybrid system of health insurance would greatly
reduce "the administrative costs of a fragmented system."80
Conclusion
The court in AARP III determined that an employer may
alter, reduce, or drop health benefits once a retiree becomes
eligible for Medicare without meeting the "equal benefit/equal
cost" anti-discrimination requirement in the ADEA."' Whatever
the permanent solution to this problem may be, it clearly resides
with Congress and not the judiciary or a regulatory agency.
Congress should generate a permanent solution, whether by
lowering the cost of health care, reforming Medicare, or
implementing a universal health care system. Although the most
effective solution to this problem lies in congressional action, the
AARP III court erred by inadequately reviewing the claims
presented by AARP against the EEOC and upholding a regulation
that effectively repeals legislation guarding against age
discrimination.
This case is representative of much larger problems
surrounding health care, Medicare, and retiree health benefits in
the United States for older people."2 If this failure to protect the
rights and interests of older people continues, the United States
will truly become "no country for old men" and women.
277. See DENAVAS-WALT, supra note 21, at 19.
278. See QUADAGNO, supra note 41, at 201 (summarizing the various attempts to
implement a universal health care system since the 1910s).
279. See id. at 201-12 (detailing the strengths and weaknesses of each of these
proposals, all of which have "been under consideration for more than half a
century").
280. COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 11, at 5.
281. AARP III, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2007).
282. See supra Part I.
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